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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs present the Court with a false choice: either impose a 
drastic contempt sanction (such as shutting down all public schools) or 
admit that the Court does not really care about constitutional rights. In 
their telling, failure to impose a drastic sanction would be akin to the 
Court approving of racial segregation, Japanese internment, or Nazi 
propaganda. The Court should reject their bullying tactics and instead give 
effect to the whole Washington Constitution, allow the Legislature room 
to complete its task, and remain vigilant to ensure ultimate compliance 
with the State's constitutional obligations. The issues in this case are too 
important to give in to Plaintiffs' hyperbole. 
Plaintiffs' first mistake (repeated by some Amici) is focusing on 
the wrong issue as the basis for a contempt sanction. This Court held the 
State in contempt for failure to enact a plan to meet the Court's 2018 
deadline for constitutional compliance. The State has now enacted a plan 
for meeting the deadline. Yet Plaintiffs and Amici argue for a new 
sanction based on the State's alleged failure now to meet the 2018 
deadline for constitutional compliance. That misdirection ignores that the 
Court did not hold the State in contempt for failure to meet the ultimate 
obligation. Basing a contempt sanction on failure to achieve ultimate 
compliance would thus be premature and inappropriate. 
1 
Plaintiffs and Amici also err in dismissing the State's enacted plan. 
They argue that the plan is "meaningless" because it leaves important 
decisions to the 2017 Legislature. But this is ultimately an attack on the 
Court's original 2012 decision, which declined to order a specific, 
immediate remedy and instead appropriately allowed the State time to 
develop ways to meet the extraordinary new financial obligations 
the ruling imposed. Plaintiffs and Amici also object to the plan's 
requirement to study the actual costs of teacher compensation. But they 
simultaneously criticize the State for allegedly not calculating the actual 
costs of other subjects covered by this Court's 2012 ruling. They can't 
have it both ways. 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs offer soundbites rather than solutions. 
Comparing the State to George Wallace may garner media attention, but it 
does little to advance the issues in this case. This is not a situation where 
the State denies its constitutional obligations; rather, members of the 
Legislature (and public) disagree about how to meet those obligations. 
This Court appropriately left it to the Legislature to try to reach agreement 
on the appropriate combination of revenue enhancements, cuts to other 
programs, and other changes necessary to comply with the State's 
constitutional obligations. There is no basis for the Court to end that 
democratic process before the deadline the Court itself imposed. And there 
2 
is certainly no basis to order the closure of public schools, harming the 
very schoolchildren our constitution protects. Instead, the Court should 
recognize that the State has enacted a plan, should purge the contempt 
sanction, and should evaluate the Legislature's compliance with its 
ultimate constitutional obligations on the timeline the Court imposed. 
I.I. ARGUMENT 
The issue before the Court is whether the State has complied with 
the orders requiring it to submit a plan. The State has complied. The order 
of contempt should be dissolved and the sanction terminated. 
A. There Is No Legal or Factual Basis for Imposing Additional 
Sanctions 
1. The State has submitted a plan and therefore has 
purged contempt 
Plaintiffs and some Amici mischaracterize the Court's orders 
finding the State in contempt and imposing sanctions by focusing on the 
2018 deadline for compliance rather than the language of the orders.1 The 
Superintendent of Public Instruction directs almost all his attention to new 
sanctions that he believes should be imposed. 
I See Plaintiff/Respondents' 2016 Post-Budget Filing (Pls.' Br.) at 43-49; SPI 
Amicus at 2-3; Paramount Duty Amicus at 4. Amicus Arc of Washington focuses on 
special education funding, essentially attempting to relitigate issues decided in School 
Districts' Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Education v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 
601, 244 P.3d 1 (2010). Their arguments are more properly raised in a new complaint. 
The Court found the State in contempt for not submitting a plan—
not for failing to meet the 2018 deadline three years early. Order, 
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014), at 4. The Court 
imposed a sanction to coerce the submission of a plan—not to compel full 
constitutional compliance before the 2018 deadline. Order, McCleary v. 
State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), at 1. 
The State has submitted a plan, enacted as E2SSB 6195 (Laws of 
2016, ch. 3), that identifies the final steps to be taken on the road to 
achieving compliance by 2018. And in that plan the Legislature 
categorically stated its intent to reform state funding of compensation to 
provide "competitive salaries and benefits that are sufficient to hire and 
retain competent certificated instructional staff, administrators, and 
classified staff," "eliminat[e] school district dependency on local levies 
for implementation of the state's program of basic education," and 
complete its implementation of ESHB 2261 (Laws of 2009, ch. 548) and 
SHB 2776 (Laws of 2010, ch. 236). E2SSB 6195, § 1. If it succeeds in 
doing so, the State will be in compliance with the decision in McCleary v. 
State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs would have the Court punish the State now 
for not having produced a plan before 2016. Pls.' Br. at 32-33. But the 
Court already imposed a sanction of $100,000 a day to continue until a 
plan was enacted. A plan now has been submitted and the question before 
the Court is whether it should dissolve its order of contempt and stop 
further accumulation of the sanction now that a plan has been enacted. 
In short, there is no basis on which to find the State in continued 
contempt or for continuing the sanction. Before there can be any new 
sanction, there must be a finding of new contempt. And before there can 
be any of the draconian sanctions proposed by the Superintendent, there 
must be a finding that the new or continuing contempt is so egregious as to 
require such severe sanctions. The Court should reject the ongoing 
attempts of Plaintiffs and some Amici to use the contempt order as a 
vehicle for imposing a prospective sanction simply because they assume a 
future failure to meet a deadline that is still two years away. See State ex 
rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 87, 436 P.2d 786 (1968) ("[W]e 
cannot pass on the constitutionality of proposed legislation ... until the 
legislative process is complete and the bill or measure has been enacted 
into law."). 
2. The attacks on the plan by Plaintiffs and Amici are 
unfounded and legally in error 
Lacking compelling legal critiques of the State's plan, Plaintiffs 
instead try to bully the Court, arguing that acceptance of the plan would be 
W 
equivalent to approving of George Wallace's opposition to desegregation 
(Pls.' Br. at 442), the World War II internment of Japanese Americans 
(Pls.' Br. at 43 n.87, 49), or the Nazi propaganda machine (Pls.' Br. at 30 
n.63). While such inflammatory rhetoric may be increasingly and 
troublingly common in our nation's political discourse, it is unhelpful and 
inappropriate here. The Court should reject Plaintiffs' inflammatory 
rhetoric and focus instead on assessing the substance of the enacted plan. 
At the end of the day, the issues in this case can be resolved only 
by a Legislature whose members can come together to solve a particularly 
difficult and complex problem with guidance from this Court. Plaintiffs' 
inflammatory rhetoric does not move the bail forward. It is unnecessary, 
counterproductive, and distracting. 
a. Plaintiffs and Amici fail to establish that 
additional data and analysis are unnecessary 
In criticizing the State's plan, Plaintiffs and some Amici argue that 
no further information is needed. While they cite a variety of previous 
studies going back to 1982 as important, they contend that the current 
work of the Education Funding Task Force initiated by E2SSB 6195 
cannot possibly be important or necessary. See Pls.' Br. at 33-34; 
SPI Amicus at 3; Paramount Duty Amicus at 7. 
2 See also Pls.' 2015 Br. at 10 (July 27, 2015); Pls.' 2014 Br. at 38 (May 21, 
2014); Pls.' 2013 Br. at 39 (Sept. 30, 2013). 
C 
But neither Plaintiffs nor Amici have been able to unearth 
and refer the Court (or the Legislature) to any current analysis that 
(a) delineates district-by-district compensation paid beyond the state salary 
allocations generated through the prototypical school model; (b) identifies 
the funding sources of the additional paid compensation; and (c) reveals 
the precise mix of basic education and local enhancement duties supported 
by the additional pay.3 If those data are present in one of the studies 
Plaintiffs and Amici reference, it should have been a simple matter to 
identify it for the Legislature and the Court. 
Presumably, Plaintiffs are well positioned and motivated to 
identify such information, since they have argued repeatedly that the State 
does not pay the actual cost of compensation necessary to support the 
State's program of basic education. Instead, they provide a short list of 
bills and reports issued between 1982 and 2012 and essentially tell the 
Court to go search for the information. See Pls.' Br. at 5-6, 33-34. 
The Superintendent suggests the information exists in the 2012 
Compensation Technical Working Group Final Report, but does not 
provide a citation showing where such information is to be found. SPI 
3 E2SSB 6195, § 1, p. 2; Joint Education Funding Task, Jessica Harrell & Bryon 
Moore, Salary Spending by School Districts: What We Know, What We Don't Know 
(May 11, 2016), https:Happ.leg.wa.gov/CMD/document.aspx?agency=4&year=2016& 
cid=17131&mid=25309&hid=193564—(web page, click on Other, click on Internal —
K-12 Compensation Overview Charts). 
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Amicus at 3. Appendix 2 of the Final Report contains some minimal 
information on funding sources in the form of three pie charts showing 
percentages of 2010-11 average additional salary above state allocation.4 
But the Final Report does not identify where the underlying data came 
from, what level of detail is available by district, what services are 
supported by the additional salary, or the source of the funding beyond 
"local." 
Amicus Washington's Paramount Duty claims that the State has 
failed to explain why this study is needed, given the history of previous 
studies. Paramount Duty Amicus at 7-8. Actually, the State did explain 
and just did so again here. See E2SSB 6195, § 1; 2016 Reports at 8-10; 
State's Br. at 11-14. Paramount Duty simply does not like the explanation. 
Taken together, Plaintiffs and these Amici are arguing that they, 
not the Legislature, know what information the Legislature needs in order 
to craft and enact the best remedial legislative policy. The Legislature 
itself, in a duly enacted statute, has made the determination that further 
data collection is necessary for the Legislature's "`uniquely constituted 
fact-finding and opinion gathering processes' [that] provide the best forum 
4 Compensation Technical Working Group Final Report 81 (June 30, 2012), 
http://www. k 12.wa.us/Compensation/CompTechWorkGroupReport/CompTechWorkGro 
up.pdf (last visited June 16, 2016). 
5 2016 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select 
Committee on Article IXLitigation (May 18, 2016). 
8 
for addressing the difficult policy questions inherent in forming the details 
of an education system." McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting Seattle 
Sch. Dist. I v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 551, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (Utter, J., 
concurring)). Plaintiffs would have the Court deny the Legislature the 
opportunity to gather additional data and policy recommendations. 
Paramount Duty also appears to argue that the State is estopped 
from arguing any need for additional data because the State previously 
argued to the Court that all the work that went into ESHB 2261 was a 
better remedial solution than starting from scratch. Paramount Duty 
Amicus at 6-7. There is no estoppel. The arguments are not inconsistent.6 
The fact that decision-makers may need more detailed information as 
plans progress from general to more specific is unremarkable and 
unsurprising. The implication of Paramount Duty's argument is that less 
information somehow leads to a better solution. 
Plaintiffs and Amici reference prior reports and other documents as 
if bare citation proves their argument. It does not. None of those prior 
efforts assembled the information needed to determine the state funding 
necessary to provide compensation adequate to attract and retain well 
6 Paramount Duty mischaracterizes the State's argument from its 2010 brief. The 
issue was whether, given the Legislature's recent enactment of ESHB 2261, the trial 
court's remedy to start over was appropriate. This Court held that it was not. McCleary, 
173 Wn.2d at 542. 
E 
qualified teachers and staff, to ensure accountability for the spending of 
state dollars, and to do so over the long term. And none of those prior 
efforts showed how school districts expend local levy dollars on staffing 
and implementing the State's program of basic education. Until that 
information is gathered, the Legislature cannot determine the amount of 
the State's constitutional obligation. 
b. Under the tests set forth by Plaintiffs and Amici, 
no plan could pass muster 
A closer look at the arguments made by Plaintiffs, the 
Superintendent, and Paramount Duty reveals that no plan could be 
sufficient under their view and sanctions therefore should be levied for 
failure to achieve compliance by 2016. They argue essentially that a plan 
is a meaningless exercise (and always was a meaningless exercise) 
because no plan, study, or legislation can bind a future Legislature. See 
Pls.' Br. at 37 ("It's meaningless to say the 2016 legislature is `requiring' 
the 2017 legislature to enact reforms...."); Pls.' Br. at 38 ("It is similarly 
meaningless to say the 2016 legislature is `committed' to having the 2017 
legislature comply with the court orders in this case...."). Under their 
arguments, no plan or promise should be believed and the only way the 
State could avoid sanctions is to have met the 2018 deadline in 2016. 
10 
The Superintendent argues that E2SSB 6195 is "demonstrably 
unreliable" because it consists of "mere words of promise." SPI Amicus at 
5-6. Paramount Duty makes a similar argument. Paramount Duty Amicus 
at 6. That argument is untenable. Just because the Legislature has chosen 
not to adopt each recommendation offered by the Superintendent or by 
various task forces and commissions is no basis for concluding that the 
commitment in E2SSB 6195 is "demonstrably unreliable." The 
Legislature does not and cannot delegate legislative authority to such 
groups. Nevertheless, it is well established that education reform to date 
has been shaped by the results of numerous studies, as outlined by the 
Court in McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 500-08. The fact that studies and 
recommendations are not adopted wholesale and verbatim does not mean 
that they failed to result in legislative action or did not provide an 
important and necessary foundation for enacted policy changes.7 
Washington Learns led to the Basic Education Finance Task Force, which 
resulted in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776. Id. at 505-10. 
Although ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 also were "mere words," 
under the Superintendent's argument, and have always been subject to 
7  The Court acknowledged that the State is not bound to adopt precisely 
the recommendations by various workgroups, because they do not provide the only 
means of achieving compliance. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 
2015), at 7. 
11 
amendment by subsequent Legislatures, the State has followed through 
with their implementation. As explained in the State's Brief at pages 
16-21, the Legislature has met every deadline it established in those bills 
and in doing so has increased annual funding over a four-year span by 
billions of dollars. 
C. The State has not ignored the current sanction 
Plaintiffs and Amici claim that new sanctions are necessary 
because the State either did not take the current sanctions of $100,000 per 
day seriously (SPI Amicus at 4), or did not consider the sanction 
significant because the State "refus[ed] to fund it" (Pls.' Br. at 46). Such 
claims are baseless. The current remedial penalty was levied by the Court 
for failure to produce a plan in 2015. The Legislature enacted a plan in 
E2SSB 6195 in 2016, as described in the State's Brief at pages 10-14. 
That alone should be sufficient to rebut the bald assertion that the penalty 
has been ignored. 
Moreover, the plan enacted in E2SSB 6195 is already being 
implemented. The Education Funding Task Force established in that 
legislation has been moving ahead to complete its assigned 
responsibilities. Its early focus has been on obtaining information in four 
areas: (1) school district reporting and accounting procedures and data 
received (and not received) by the Office of the Superintendent of Public 
12 
Instruction; (2) K-12 educator supply and demand issues; (3) what 
information is or is not reported about salary spending by school districts 
and the data collection tools necessary to obtain necessary but unreported 
information about salary spending; and (4) differences between school 
districts' actual staff allocations and staff allocations assumed in the 
prototypical funding model .8 
As directed in E2SSB 6195, the Washington State Institute for 
Public Policy timely selected and contracted with a qualified consultant,9 
who began work on May 31, 2016. The consultant is tasked with 
(1) identifying and reporting reasons for and funding sources of 
differences between actual salaries and those provided under the State's 
prototypical school model; (2) identifying and reporting market rate 
salaries comparable to each staff category in the prototypical school 
model; and (3) developing a model tool to explore local labor market 
adjustments and criteria for evaluating them. Data collection has begun. 
Deadlines are set in E2SSB 6195, section 3: the consultant's interim report 
is due September 1, 2016, and the final report and analysis is due 
November 15, 2016. 
S  See Joint Education Funding Task, http://leg.wa.gov/jointcommittees/ 
eftf/pages/default. aspx. 
9 Third Sector Intelligence, Inc. (3Si), a Seattle consulting firm 
(http://team3si.com/), in partnership with Edunomics Lab at the McCourt School of 
Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (http://edunomicslab.org/).  
13 
Neither has the executive branch ignored the sanction. On June 10, 
2016, the Office of Financial Management released its Operating Budget 
Instructions for the 2017-19 biennium. Both the cover memo and opening 
instructions explain that state agencies should not expect increased 
funding in the next biennium because of the need to fund the "continuing 
costs of major K-12 funding enhancements made in the current biennium 
and the final phasing in of legislative commitments to decrease K-3 class 
sizes in the 2017-19 biennium" and the need to "further increase state 
funding of K-12 school employee compensation at a cost of several billion 
dollars next biennium (McCleary v. State of Washington)."10 "Meeting the 
state's constitutional duty to fully fund K-12 education is an enormous 
challenge and the top budget priority."11 This language, unprecedented in 
its clarity, is a clear and affirmative response to the Court. 
3. The State remains on track to achieve constitutional 
compliance by 2018 
Plaintiffs' arguments are fundamentally flawed because they are 
premised on their measures of ultimate constitutional compliance—not on 
io Office of Fin. Mngt., Budget Div., 2017-19 Biennium Operating Budget 
Instructions 2 (June 2016), http://www.ofm.wa.gov/budget/instructions/operating/ 
2017_19/2017-19instructions.pdf; Memo from David Schumacher, Director, Office of 
Financial Management, to Agency Directors, Presidents of Higher Education Institutions, 
and Boards and Commissions (June 10, 2016), at 1 (re 2017-19 Operating and 
Capital Budget Instructions) http://www.ofin.wa.gov/budget/instructions/operating/2017_ 
19/covermemo.pdf. 
11  Id 
14 
measures established by this Court or the Legislature. The Washington 
Constitution does not confer on Plaintiffs—or on the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, for that matter—the authority to, determine the measure 
of ample funding under article IX, section 1. It is for the Legislature to 
determine in the first instance what constitutes "ample provision" for the 
State's program of basic education. And it is for the Court to determine 
whether the Legislature's provision is constitutionally sufficient. 
The Legislature is on the threshold of making that determination. 
That threshold marks the culmination of a process reflected in the reforms 
and deadlines established in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 and carried 
forward in E2SSB 6195. Once the Legislature determines the real cost and 
enacts implementing legislation, the Court can address whether the State 
has complied with article IX, section 1, as directed in the McCleary 
decision. If the Legislature fails to address the compensation challenge by 
the deadline set in McCleary, the Court then could determine whether the 
State failed to meet its constitutional obligation. 
a. The $4.8 billion increase in state spending for 
K-12 education over two biennia is real 
The State has made very real and concrete progress since 2012. 
In attempting to discredit that progress, Plaintiffs wrongly claim that 
the $4.8 billion increase in education funding between the 2011-13 
15 
biennium and the 2015-17 biennium is illusory and is actually less 
than if the State had merely maintained the "status quo" level of 
services. Pls.' Br. at 26. Plaintiffs' characterization of maintenance level is 
erroneous for several reasons. 
First, Plaintiffs argue that the State's published 2015-17 
maintenance level of $19.5 billion reflects the "status quo" costs of 
providing the same services funded in the prior biennium. They 
misunderstand this budgeting term of art. In its 2014 Report, 12 the 
Legislature's Article IX Committee provided an explanation of the term 
"maintenance level" as used in the budgeting process. 
The maintenance level budget is the estimated cost of 
providing currently authorized services in the new budget 
period. It is calculated using current ongoing 
appropriations, application of any bow wave adjustments 
(costs or savings that occur in the future because a current 
budget item is not yet fully implemented), and adjustments 
for caseload or enrollment or other funding driver changes 
to mandatory programs. 
2014 Report at 35-36. The funding driver adjustments in maintenance 
level can include costs driven by new laws or new budget items being 
phased in. It is not limited simply to the "status quo" of the cost of the 
previous level of services adjusted for caseload. See also 2016 Report at 
17 (like the MSOC allocation in the 2015-17 biennial budget, the 
12  2014 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select 
Committee on Article Mitigation (Apr. 30, 2014). 
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final increment of K-3 class funding will be included in the maintenance 
level in the next biennial budget because it is statutorily mandated in 
SHB 2776). 
Having misunderstood the meaning of "maintenance level," 
Plaintiffs compound their error by arguing that $19.5 billion represents the 
2015-17 cost of maintaining the "status quo" of the 2013-15 biennium 
level of services. In fact, the voters' approval of Initiative 1351 in 
November 2014 resulted in a sudden increase of $2 billion to 2015-17 
maintenance level costs (an increase of over 11 percent). That $2 billion 
increase temporarily brought K-12 maintenance level costs to $19.5 
billion, 13  but it represented new funding requirements that had not 
previously been implemented. It was not a mere continuation of the 
2013-15 level of service and it is incorrect to claim that the new 
$19.5 billion total reflected the cost of continuing the "status quo." 
Ultimately, the Legislature delayed phase-in dates for I-1351 for 
four years and did not fund the initiative's class size allocations in the 
2015-17 budget. 14 Contrary to Plaintiffs' claims, this policy decision 
neither decreased state spending nor decreased previously provided 
" State of Washington, Legislative Budget Notes: 2015-17 Biennium & 2015 
Supplemental 275 (Oct, 2015), http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/Ibns/2015LBN.pdf;  
State's Br. at 37. 
is 2015-17 Budget Notes at 275 (reflecting decision to postpone I-1351 
implementation as a policy-level reduction to maintenance level); State's Br. at 37. 
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services. The enacted public schools budget for 2015-17 was $18.2 
billion. 15  That was an increase from the approximately $15.3 billion for 
public schools in 2013-15, which had increased from approximately 
$13.4 billion in the 2011-13 budget. 16 
In sum, the $4.8 billion increase includes adjustments for caseloads 
and the new spending for MSOC, transportation, all-day kindergarten, and 
K-3 class size reduction, as well as all the other education-related 
increases that have been reported in the 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 
Reports and confirmed in the Budget Notes for each biennium. Plaintiffs 
cannot show that the increases are illusory. 
b. All of the SHB 2776 reforms are fully funded 
consistent with the schedule established in that 
legislation 
Plaintiffs repeat their arguments from 2015 that none of the 
SHB 2776 reform elements are actually implemented, even where the 
Court has said otherwise. For MSOC, transportation, and the highly 
15 2015-17 Budget Notes at 277. 
16  2015 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court by the Joint Select 
Committee on Article LV Litigation at 38 (July 27, 2015). Plaintiffs can be forgiven for 
also getting the figure for the 2011-13 biennium wrong. With each supplemental budget, 
appropriations are updated until, after the close of the biennium, actual expenditures are 
available. More current fiscal data shows a figure close to $13.5 billion for the 2011-13 
biennium. See 2013-15 Omnibus Budget Overview: Operating Only at 0-23, 
http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2013operating1315.pdf. That figure does not 
account for a one-time shift of apportionment of $115 million between fiscal years 2011 
and 2012 that shifted 2009-11 biennium costs to the 2011-13 biennium as a 
budget balancing effort during the fiscal crisis. State of Washington, Legislative 
Budget Notes: 2011-13 Biennium & 2011 Supplemental at 273 (Oct. 2011), 
http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/Ibns/2011  lbn.pdf. 
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capable programs, their arguments are simply that formulas are not good 
enough, notwithstanding that (1) the Court held that the ESHB 2261 and 
SHB 2776 reforms, if implemented, would remedy the constitutional 
violation (McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 540-47); and (2) the Court and the 
Superintendent subsequently recognized that transportation is fully funded 
(Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), at 5). 
As to class size reduction and all-day kindergarten, Plaintiffs make 
the same arguments, as if to re-litigate the prototypical school model as a 
remedy, and then simply repeat language from the Court's August 2015 
Order that there is "far to go" with regard to class size reduction. 
Pls.' Br. at 21. In fact, the State demonstrated in its 2016 Report and Brief 
that there is not so far to go. 2016 Report at 15-17, 30-34; State's Br. at 
18-19. The Legislature has done everything it can do in this biennium to 
ensure the last increment of K-3 class size reduction is funded as 
scheduled in SHB 2776 for the 2017-18 school year. Plaintiffs' reference 
back to the Court's 2015 Order is insufficient rebuttal. 
C. The Legislature is actively engaged in addressing 
the need for additional teachers 
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding teacher shortages assumes the 
answer to that problem is simple. It is not. To quote H.L. Mencken, 
every human problem has a solution that is "neat, plausible, and wrong." 
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H.L. Mencken, Prejudices: Second Series 158 (1921). According to the 
Professional Educator Standards Board (PESB), the current and projected 
shortages have a number of root causes, some of them following national 
trends, and some cyclical in nature. But while there are many theories, 
"there are no easy answers." 17 
The PESB identifies a number of potential strategies for addressing 
the issue, including changes in salary, local practices, routes to 
certification, educator program production and eliminating other barriers 
in the pipeline. 18  Some of these can be pursued administratively by state 
agencies and some require legislative action. Some were adopted by the 
Legislature in 2016.19 The 2016 Report detailed a number of additional 
investments made by the State to address the need for additional teachers. 
2016 Report at 18. The Education Funding Task Force is also tasked with 
forwarding recommendations as to whether any additional legislation is 
needed to help support state-funded all-day kindergarten and class size 
reduction. E2SHB 6195, § 2(3). 
17  Prof 'I Educator Standards Bd., Addressing the Recurring Problem of Teacher 
Shortages, https:Hdrive.google.com/a/pesb.wa.gov/file/d/OB-CWbSsnLOBgaOdDYmUze  
VVkMnM/view?pref-2&pli=1 (last visited June 16, 2016). 
18 Id.; Prof 'I Educator Standards Bd., Educator Workforce Supply and Demand 
Issues (presentation to Education Funding Task Force, May 11, 2016), 
https: Happ.leg.wa.gov/CMD/Handler. ashx?MethodName=getdocumentcontent&docume 
ntld=wSTKSysjAs4&att=false (last visited June 16, 2016). 
19  See n.17. 
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B. The Specific Sanctions Proposed by Plaintiffs or Amici Should 
Be Rejected 
Plaintiffs and their supporting Amici have lost sight of the basis for 
the Court's order of contempt and imposition of sanctions. They would 
have the Court consider the State to be in contempt for having not yet met 
the 2018 deadline and ask the Court to impose sanctions on the 
assumption that deadline will not be met. They offer a menu of possible 
sanctions for the Court to choose from. No sanction should be imposed. 
1. "Close or defund schools" 
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent again propose shutting down the 
public schools as a sanction to compel legislative action. They again show 
their willingness to directly harm the very schoolchildren they claim to be 
advocating for as their means to an end. 
Plaintiffs' approach is indirect. They ask the Court to issue an 
order now that invalidates all "unconstitutionally funded school statutes" 
on the first day of the 2017-18 school year if the Legislature does not 
"choose to fully comply with the court orders and declaratory judgments 
issued in this case." Pls.' Br. at 48. That would set a date for shutting 
down schools. Putting aside the ambiguity of this request, its inevitable 
effect would be to create immense uncertainty for schools, school 
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children, teachers, and parents as they anticipate and plan for the 2017-18 
school year. It would be especially problematic for students going into 
their senior year with post-secondary plans. This is so for two reasons. 
First, the ultimate legislative remedy likely will not be finally achieved 
until late in the 2017 session as the budget is approved. Second, Plaintiffs 
almost certainly will challenge the sufficiency of any action the 
Legislature takes, and public uncertainty will continue until any such 
challenge is resolved. 
The Superintendent suggests a direct approach: simply enjoin 
operation of the schools. SPI Amicus at 16-18. Just shut them down. 
As Plaintiffs did before, the Superintendent cites Robinson v. Cahill 
(Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 161, 358 A.2d 457 (1976), as a "successful" 
model for the sanction they seek. Perhaps it is time to examine the claimed 
"success" of that model more closely. To assist the Court, concise 
summaries of the New Jersey litigation are provided in the appendix to 
this brief. 
In Robinson VI, the court ordered the shutdown of public schools 
in New Jersey as of July 1, 1976, if the state legislature did not act to fund 
a new public education act. The schools were closed, the legislature 
enacted a new income tax, and the schools were reopened after eight days. 
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Plaintiffs and the Superintendent end their story of the New Jersey 
school funding saga at this point, arguing that closing the schools in 
Washington will be just as effective in compelling a solution as it was in 
New Jersey. Let's hope not, because the New Jersey saga did not end in 
1976. More than forty years after the litigation began, the court was still 
mandating specific educational reforms and managing their 
implementation. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d 
1018 (2011) (finding inadequate funding of education reform legislation). 
Derivative litigation is still percolating in administrative tribunals and 
lower courts. See Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. 
Super. 24, 126 A.3d 1244 (2015) (procedural dismissal of appeal). The 
New Jersey saga continues. 
The lesson of the New Jersey litigation, applied to the arguments 
of Plaintiffs and the Superintendent should be unmistakable. Closing down 
the schools in the summer of 1976 did prompt the New Jersey legislature 
to enact a new tax. It did not result in full funding of the educational 
reforms ordered by the court or in the cessation of litigation. Instead, the 
court found itself locked in a decades-long conflict with the legislative and 
executive branches, with the ultimate resolution still in doubt. 
Moreover, a court-ordered closure of schools would result in court-
imposed violations of federal law or the loss of federal funding. For 
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example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-1482, guarantees children with disabilities access to "a free 
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs[.]" 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A). The Act operates by providing federal funding to state 
and local agencies and requiring them, as a requirement for funding, to 
provide certain programs and services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). If public 
schools were closed in Washington, they could not satisfy their obligations 
under the Act. Closing schools could jeopardize federal funding under 
several other programs with cost-sharing requirements, including funding 
for disadvantaged students (20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578), for students who 
speak languages other than English (20 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6871), and for the 
education of homeless children (42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435). 
2. "Strike, suspend, or enjoin tax preferences, credits, and 
deductions" 
The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin the operation 
of "certain state tax exemptions, credits, and preferential tax rates" enacted 
in the 2013, 2014, and 2015 legislative sessions. SPI Amicus at 11-12. 
Plaintiffs appear to propose the same sanction. Pls.' Br. at 48. This 
argument puts the Court on a slippery slope that slides across 
constitutional limitations imposed by separation of powers. Under their 
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approach, the Court could reach out to invalidate any statute enacted in 
2013, 2014, or 2015 that has any effect on state revenue or spending. As 
explained in prior briefing, the Court is not constitutionally free to assume 
the legislative function. See State of Washington's Opening Brief 
Addressing Order to Show Cause at 17-23 (filed July 11, 2011); State of 
Washington's Reply Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 10-14 
(filed Aug. 25, 2014). 
Moreover, this proposed remedy, like others proposed by the 
Plaintiffs and their supporters, asks the Court to sanction third parties as a 
means to compel action by the Legislature, and to do so without regard to 
the culpability or complicity of those third parties, and without regard 
to the quality or magnitude of harm that might be caused. 
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent apparently believe that enjoining 
the operation of state tax credits and exemptions would be straightforward 
and efficient. In fact, it likely would require substantial time and money to 
implement such an injunction. Although their suggestion is sufficiently 
abstract that an accurate assessment is not presently possible, we can 
identify some issues and problems that would have to be addressed for any 
such injunction to be workable and enforceable. 
For example, the Superintendent suggests the Court could order the 
Department of Revenue to simply "disallow any of the enjoined tax breaks 
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that appear on tax returns filed with the Department." SPI Amicus at 14. 
The Department receives over two million tax returns annually 20  and 
almost certainly lacks the resources to manually identify and review each 
return in order to disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, and 
preferences subject to injunction, and then to demand additional payment 
from each taxpayer who claimed an "enjoined tax break." If a lack of 
resources leads to inconsistent application of the injunction, the inevitable 
result would be sharp increases in the numbers of taxpayer complaints, 
requests for review, and lawsuits. If the Superintendent's goal is to 
increase taxpayer dissatisfaction with government, he has identified an 
effective approach to achieve that goal. 
One potential alternative to the quick-fix approach suggested by 
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent would be to allow the Department to 
implement an injunction in the same manner as it implements a change in 
tax law. That implementation would require time and money to train staff, 
educate taxpayers, revise the state combined excise tax return and 
instructions, reprogram software, and update taxpayer dispute and refund 
procedures. In the normal situation, where enacted legislation has been 
developed over time in consultation with the Department, that 
implementation may take a couple of months (or longer if the changes are 
20 http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/Pubs/Misc/RevenueAtAGIance.pdf.  
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substantial). Implementing an injunction that affects scores of tax 
provisions would have to be accomplished using existing Department 
resources and could take many months. 
Under either approach, affected taxpayers could bring lawsuits 
alleging, for example, that the injunction violates their right to due process 
by depriving them of a duly enacted deduction, exemption, credit, or 
preference without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Businesses 
would have to update their bookkeeping and accounting systems in 
response to an injunction. They may need to revise contracts with 
suppliers or customers, reprogram point-of-sale systems and online 
transaction systems. 
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent address none of these issues and 
consequences. They expect the Court to resolve them. 
3. "Enjoin county treasurers from disbursing special levy 
revenues to school districts" 
The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin county 
treasurers from disbursing revenues collected from special excess levies, 
on the ground that the expenditure of such moneys in support of the 
State's program of basic education violates article IX, section 1 and this 
Court's decisions in Seattle School District and McCleary. There are at 
least four significant problems with this proposed remedy. 
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First, it rests on a mischaracterization of the contempt order and 
sanction issued in this case. As explained above, the Superintendent is 
focused on ultimate constitutional compliance, while the contempt order 
and sanction were imposed to compel the submission of a legislative plan. 
Second, it is overbroad. There is no evidence to suggest that 
all special levy revenues are used to pay for basic education, but the 
Superintendent's proposal would enjoin the payment of any school district 
revenues from special levies. 
Third, the only justification offered for the requested injunction is 
as a contempt sanction. It would require a finding of contempt against all 
295 school districts for a contempt sanction to be levied against them. 
There has been no showing of the factual predicates for such a finding or 
any judicial determination of unconstitutionality as to any specific school 
district. All we have is the Superintendent's assertion in an amicus brief 
that local school districts have "acted improperly" by using special levies 
to pay for basic education. SPI Amicus at 10. On that basis, he asks the 
Court to sanction all school districts without regard to their status or 
culpability under the McCleary decision and orders. 
Fourth, local school districts would have no ability to purge 
contempt since, under the theory advanced by the Superintendent, it is 
only the Legislature's action that can do so. See Int'l Union, United Mine 
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Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 
129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1994) (civil contempt sanction must give contemnor 
opportunity to avoid the sanction); In re Pers. Restraint of King, 110 
Wn.2d 793, 799-800, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988) (same); State v. Boatman, 104 
Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985) (same). The Superintendent would 
punish school districts for the State's noncompliance. 
4. "Enjoin the expenditure of state funds for non- 
education purposes" 
The Superintendent suggests the Court could enjoin state spending 
of non-education state moneys that are not constitutionally required or 
necessary to preserve public health and safety. SPI Amicus at 15. 
Plaintiffs make the same suggestion. Pls.' Br. at 48. 
The Superintendent would identify spending to be enjoined using 
state contingency planning done in 2015 in anticipation of a possible 
government shutdown. Using that planning, the following programs and 
services are examples of those that would be shut down or discontinued 21: 
• Women Infants and Children (WIC) food and nutrition 
programs. 
• State medical services for the aged, blind, or disabled. 
• Need grants for students at Washington universities. 
21  See https:Hs3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2090195/ 
agency-contingency-plans-summary-2015.pdf. 
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• Opportunity grants for students at Washington community 
colleges. 
• The State's health care program for undocumented children. 
• The Washington Department of Agriculture's food assistance 
program and pesticide waste disposal program. 
• The Washington Department of Commerce's housing and 
essential needs program and homeless services program. 
• Non-emergency investigations of misconduct by health 
professionals. 
• HIV client services. 
• Health inspections of shellfish operations. 
• The Washington Department of Health's kidney disease and 
dialysis program. 
• State-only programs including funding for senior citizen 
services, county community mental health, and individual and 
family services for the developmentally disabled. 
• The Washington Department of Early Learning's working 
connection child care program and some services providing 
background checks. 
• Certain community outreach programs for veterans. 
• Distribution of state funding to local governments, used to 
support local criminal justice agencies, emergency 
communications, juvenile detention, mental health, and public 
safety. 
• WorkSource offices. 
• Vocational rehabilitation services. 
• New applications for worker compensation benefits. 
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• The Office of Crime Victims Advocacy. 
• Transfer of new offenders from county jails to state 
correctional facilities. 
• Most community corrections services. 
• Response to requests for GPS tracking for sex offenders. 
• Fish and wildlife enforcement. 
• Fish hatcheries operation. 
• Certain sport and commercial fisheries. 
• State parks. 
• All activities relating to approximately two dozen business and 
occupation licenses. 
• Complete shutdown of at least 32 state agencies. 
Plaintiffs and the Superintendent display no concern for the public 
value of these programs and services or for the people who rely on them. 
Again, they have lost sight of the fact that making ample provision for 
public schools is not the State's sole duty. The State has many other 
important duties, from providing mental health treatment to feeding 
hungry children, that have an impact on education. Children who are 
hungry, homeless, or being abused are extremely unlikely to succeed in 
school. See Columbia Legal Servs. Amicus. The State has a responsibility 
to fund and oversee all of these obligations. 
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5. "Hold individual legislators in contempt and impose 
monetary sanctions against them" 
It would be an unprecedented and extraordinary intrusion on the 
legislative branch to hold individual legislators in contempt for failure to 
take action as legislators, and no case supports such a result. Though the 
Superintendent advocates this approach, he cites no case in which this 
Court (or any other State's court) issued a contempt order against any 
individual legislator for action taken as a legislator, and he says nothing 
about constitutional limits on the Court's power. This proposed remedy 
lies outside the Court's constitutional power. 
In their 2014 brief, Plaintiffs advocated this remedy, relying on 
United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), in which the 
United States sued the city for intentionally maintaining racial segregation 
in residential areas and schools. The city ultimately entered into a consent 
judgment, but the city council refused to enact a public housing ordinance 
it had agreed to. The district court held the city and the four council 
members who voted against the ordinance in contempt and imposed 
financial sanctions, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed this decision as an abuse of judicial 
discretion because (1) the city council members were not named as 
parties, (2) the "extraordinary" imposition of sanctions against individual 
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council members should not have been imposed until sanctions imposed 
on the city alone failed to secure compli-ance, and (3) considerations 
supporting the legislative immunity doctrine must inform a court's 
discretion in imposing sanctions. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 
280, 110 S. Ct. 625, 107 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1990).22 
Consistent with Spallone, any sanction directed toward individual 
legislators here would be inappropriate because it could force legislators to 
vote to serve their personal interests (getting out of contempt) rather than 
the interests of their constituents and the public. Restrictions on legislative 
freedom undermine representative democracy. Moreover, individual 
legislators are not parties; Plaintiffs sued the State. And individual 
legislators do not enact laws; for the State to enact a plan, pass a 
budget, or fulfill its article IX duty, the Legislature must act collectively. 
Const. art. II, § 22. 
The doctrine of legislative immunity does not, of course, prevent 
this Court from determining the constitutionality of the Legislature's 
actions and ordering compliance. That power is beyond question. But 
legislative immunity is an element of separation of powers. When the 
Washington Constitution was adopted, the federal Speech or Debate 
22  Because the order of contempt was ordered by a federal court, state 
constitutional separation of powers limitations were not implicated. 
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Clause was understood to protect legislators from any liability or judicial 
action for their legislative votes. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 
204, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880). The framers of our Washington Constitution 
presumably shared that understanding when adopting a state speech and 
debate clause in article II, section 17.23 A contempt order here directed at 
individual legislators or an order threatening or imposing sanctions on 
individual legislators because of their legislative deliberations or votes 
would violate article II, section 17. 
Moreover, the Superintendent is asking the Court to use the threat 
of sanctions to compel specific votes, which unmistakably invades the 
authority vested solely in the Legislature by article II of the Washington 
Constitution. See State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst., Inc. v. Kinnear, 80 
Wn.2d 175, 182, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972) (the Legislature's plenary power 
includes its power "to do those things necessarily incident to the 
enactment of laws . the power is procedural as well as substantive"). 24 
23  Article II, section 17 was taken from the Wisconsin Constitution [art. IV, 
§ 16]. Robert F. Utter & Hugh D. Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution 72 (2d ed. 
2013). The Wisconsin provision was drafted by its framers to "ensure the independence 
of the legislature and the integrity of the legislative process by precluding the possibility 
of intimidation or harassment of members of the legislature." State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 
122, 141-42, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). That provision reaches legislators' actions that "are 
within the regular course of the legislative process." Id. at 143-44. Deliberating on 
legislation and casting votes on bills is squarely within the regular course of the 
legislative process. 
24  This Court has acknowledged the coequal status of the Legislature at least 
since State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 462-63, 34 P. 201 (1893) (rejecting the 
"false theory" that only the judiciary can be "entrusted" to enforce the constitution). 
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In any event, there is more than just the Court's authority to 
consider. When contemplating sanctions, the potential effectiveness of the 
sanction to compel the desired outcome must be considered. Does the 
Superintendent seriously believe that imposing monetary sanctions on 
individual legislators would lead to legislative progress on school 
funding? A more dispassionate observer of this case might reasonably 
conclude that such sanctions would bring legislative progress to a 
standstill. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Legislature has not sat on its hands. Although the remaining 
steps are big, the Legislature has been progressing along the path toward 
compliance that this Court and the Superintendent identified as a remedy 
for the constitutional deficiencies in 2012. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 484 
(describing ESHB 2261 as a "promising reform package ... which, if 
fully funded, will remedy deficiencies in the K-12 funding system"); id, at 
543 (quoting testimony by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, in 
which he agreed that ESHB 2261 would meet the State's constitutional 
duty when fully implemented in 2018, if it was fully funded). It is not yet 
2018 and the State has not completed its implementation of that 
"promising reform package," but it has met every deadline along the 
way and formally committed in E2SSB 6195 to meeting the final 
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deadline. Because there is no legitimate basis for continuing the order of 
contempt and the imposition of a sanction, there most certainly is no basis 
for imposing a heightened sanction. 
This Court should dissolve its contempt order against the State and 
lift the sanction order imposing a daily penalty on the State. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June 2016. 
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Summary of Major New Jersey School Funding Litigation 
Robinson v. Cahill 
New Jersey Supreme Court cases, 1970-1976 
• In 1970, a lawsuit challenged New Jersey's system of public school 
funding, claiming it did not comply with the state constitutional 
requirement to provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public 
schools (N.J. Const., art. VIII, § 4). The New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that the state's then-existing system of financing public 
elementary and secondary schools violated the "thorough and 
efficient" clause of the state constitution, because it produced gross 
disparities in per-pupil expenditures, brought about by a substantial 
reliance upon local taxes. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 
473, 303 A.2d 273, cent. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The court gave 
the legislature until December 1974 to adopt remedial legislation. 
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson II), 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973). 
• When the New Jersey legislature took no action, the court scheduled 
additional briefing and oral argument, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 
III), 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), after which it imposed an interim 
remedy in which it ordered a redistribution of education funds to 
partially equalize the funding disparities for the 1976-77 school year. 
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975). 
Two days before the interim remedy was to take effect, the legislature 
passed the Public School Education Act of 1975, which contained a 
new funding equalization mechanism. The Robinson plaintiffs 
immediately challenged the Act, but the court held it was facially 
constitutional, based on the assumption it would be funded. Robinson 
v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). 
• The legislature did not fully fund the Act because of political 
opposition to a state income tax. In May 1976, over two extended 
dissents, a divided court issued an order imposing an injunction that 
would take effect on July 1, 1976, if the legislature did not enact 
legislation to fund the Act by that date. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 
VI), 70 N.J. 155, 160-61, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The conditional 
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injunction enjoined all public officers in New Jersey "from expending 
any funds for the support of any free public school," with certain 
exceptions, beginning on July 1, 1976. Id. at 160. The legislature did 
not act by July 1, 1976 and the injunction took effect. Alfonso 
Narvaez, "Jersey Schools Closed by Court Order," New York Times, 
July 1, 1976, at Al. 
• On July 7, 1976, the legislature passed a bill containing the state's first 
income tax, and the governor signed it the next day. Alfonso A. 
Narvaez, "New Jersey Votes State Income Tax; Byrne Signs Bill," 
New York Times, July 9, 1976, at Al. On July 9, at the governor's 
request, the New Jersey Supreme Court lifted its injunction. Robinson 
v. Cahill (Robinson VII), 79 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976). 
Abbott v. Burke 
New Jersey Supreme Court cases, 1981-2011(?) 
• In 1981, an applied challenge to the 1975 Act was filed, again alleging 
a violation of the "thorough and efficient" clause of the state 
constitution.' Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 100 N.J. 269, 495 A.2d 376 
(1985). After a remand for administrative fact finding, the court held 
the Act unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts 
(which became known as "Abbott districts"). Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 
II), 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990). 
• The legislature increased state appropriations to Abbott districts, but 
the court found the increase unconstitutional because it did not assure 
"substantial equivalence" among school districts. Abbott v. Burke 
(Abbott III), 136 N.J. 444, 643 A.2d 575 (1994). 
• The legislature then enacted comprehensive reform legislation 
containing new educational standards to define and assess a thorough 
and efficient education, funding for regular education as defined by the 
new educational standards, and funding for supplemental programs 
determined essential in the Abbott districts. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 
IV), 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997). The court declared that 
j The New Jersey Supreme Court itself seems to have recognized the 
inevitability of further litigation following its final resolution of Robinson v. Cahill. 
See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 119 N.J. 287, 300, 575 A.2d 359 (1990) (describing the 
Abbott litigation as "[p]redictably flowing from our decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 69 
N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (Robinson V)"). 
2a 
legislation to be unconstitutional as applied to the Abbott districts and 
remanded to the superior court to determine what judicial relief was 
necessary. Id. 2 
A special master devised recommended reforms, as did state education 
and finance officials, which the court largely adopted in Abbott v. 
Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998). The court 
ordered the reforms implemented as quickly as possible.3  
The plaintiffs continued to press their challenge. Two years later, the 
court held that there were deficiencies in the implementation of 
preschool education, but rejected the plaintiffs' request to order even 
smaller class sizes. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 163 N.J. 95, 748 A.2d 
82 (2000). The court also clarified the state's funding responsibilities 
2 Apparently, in response to the decision in Abbott IV, a third group of plaintiffs, 
comprising rural property-poor school districts brought an action alleging the new 
standards and funding violated the "thorough and efficient" clause of the New Jersey 
Constitution as applied to them. See Bacon v. New Jersey State Dep't of Educ., 398 N.J. 
Super. 600, 942 A.2d 827 (2008). That litigation has not so far made its way to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, but it was still active as of late last year. Bacon v. New Jersey 
State Dep't ofEduc., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 126 A.3d 1244 (2015). 
s The New Jersey Supreme Court took it upon itself to determine what reforms 
would improve educational outcomes: 
[W]e determine and direct that the [state Commissioner of 
Education] implement whole-school reform; implement full-day 
kindergarten and a half-day pre-school program for three- and four-year 
olds as expeditiously as possible; implement the technology, alternative 
school, accountability, and school-to-work and college-transition 
programs; prescribe procedures and standards to enable individual 
schools to adopt additional or extended supplemental programs and to 
seek and obtain the funds necessary to implement those programs for 
which they have demonstrated a particularized need; implement the 
facilities plan and timetable he proposed; secure funds to cover the 
complete cost of remediating identified life-cycle and infrastructure 
deficiencies in Abbott school buildings as well as the cost of providing 
the space necessary to house Abbott students adequately; and promptly 
initiate effective managerial responsibility' over school construction, 
including necessary funding measures and fiscal reforms, such as may 
be achieved through amendment of the Educational Facilities Act. 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998). The court ordered these 
reforms without any reference to or consideration of separation of powers or the 
constitutional limits on its own authority. 
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where school districts' circumstances changed over time. Abbott v. 
Burke (Abbott VII), 164 N.J. 84, 751 A.2d 1032 (2000). 
• The state Department of Education developed a new preschool 
curriculum strategy, but plaintiffs challenged the pace of 
implementation and alleged other shortcomings. The court ordered the 
Department to meet its deadlines and make other improvements. 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VIII), 170 N.J. 537, 790 A.2d 842 (2002). 
But four months later, the court granted the Department's request 
to "relax the remedies for K-12 programs" for one year because of a 
state budget crisis. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IX), 172 N.J. 294, 798 
A.2d 602 (2002). 
• When disputes arose regarding Department proposals to improve 
implementation of "whole school reform," the court ordered 
mediation, which led to agreement on all disputed issues except 
whether the "relaxation of remedies" could extend another year 
because of the continuing state budget crisis. The court approved the 
agreement in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott X), 177 N.J. 578, 832 A.2d 891 
(2003), and allowed the relaxed remedies to continue for another year 
under a series of administrative and procedural requirements. Abbott v. 
Burke (Abbott XI), 177 N.J. 596, 832 A.2d 906 (2003). 
• The court issued three decisions the following year addressing other 
disputes and issues that arose. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XII), 180 N.J. 
444, 832 A.2d 185 (2004); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIII), 181 N.J. 
311, 857 A.2d 173 (2004); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIV), 182 N.J. 
153, 862 A.2d 538 (2004). 
• In 2005, when the Department failed to file its annual facilities report 
and most school districts did not meet the deadline for filing long-
range facilities plans, the court set new deadlines and ordered the 
Department and the school districts to comply with them. Abbott v. 
Burke (Abbott XV), 185 N.J. 162, 889 A.2d 1063 (2005). 
• In 2006, the Court issued two orders addressing school districts' 
responsibility to file budget requests consistent with the revenue 
sources set out in the state's budget and their ability to appeal 
inadequate funding. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVI), 187 N.J. 191, 901 
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A.2d 299 (2006); Abbott v. Burke, 203 N.J. 157, 1 A.3d 602 (2006).4 
The court denied two subsequent requests by the plaintiffs for remedial 
relief. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVII), 193 N.J. 34, 935 A.2d 1152 
(2007); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XVIII), 196 N.J. 451, 956 A.2d 923 
(2008). 
• In 2008, the New Jersey legislature enacted yet another new funding 
formula, which the plaintiffs challenged. The court declined to afford 
the new formula a presumption of validity, placed the burden on the 
state to demonstrate constitutionality, sent the case to a special master 
to develop an evidentiary record, and required the state to continue 
complying with the court's orders pending a decision on the 
constitutionality of the new legislation. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XIX), 
196 N.J. 544, 960 A.2d 360 (2008). After receiving the special 
master's report and the arguments of the parties, the court held that the 
new legislation was constitutional, contingent on adequate funding and 
further review after implementation. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 
N.J. 140, 971 A.2d 989 (2009). 
• Two years later, the court, in a split decision (three justices in the 
majority, two dissenting, and two not participating), found that the 
state had not fully funded the new formula and ordered the state to 
provide full funding to the Abbott districts in future appropriations. 
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 206 N.J. 332, 20 A.3d 1018 (2011). 
Abbott XXI appears to be the most recent decision issued in that case. 
4 Because of a publisher's error, the second 2006 order was not published until 
2010. Perhaps for that reason, that order is not assigned a Roman numeral in New Jersey 
citations to the Abbott decisions and orders. 
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